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 In this paper we propose and defend three economic arguments for permitting 
assisted dying. These arguments are not intended to in provide a rationale for 
legalising assisted suicide or euthanasia in and of themselves; rather, they are 
supplementary arguments that should not be neglected when considering the ethics 
of assisted dying.  The first argument is that permitting assisted dying enables 
consenting patients to avoid negative quality-adjusted life years (QALYs), enabling 
avoidance of suffering. The second argument is that the resources consumed by 
patients who are denied assisted dying could instead be used to provide additional 
QALYs for patients elsewhere in the healthcare system who wish to continue living 
and to improve their quality of life. The third argument is that organ donation may be 
an additional potential source of QALYs in this context. We also anticipate and 
provide counterarguments to several objections to our thesis. Taken together, the 
cumulative avoidance of negative QALYs and gain in positive QALYs suggest that 
permitting assisted dying would substantially benefit both the small population that 
seeks assisted suicide or euthanasia, and the larger general population. As such, 




 Quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) have been used for decades in healthcare 
allocation decision-making. By combining quality of life and mortality into one metric, 
they enable quantification of the medical gains and losses and relative financial costs 
of a vast diversity of treatments and interventions, in turn enabling these different 
treatments to be compared against each other and funding decisions to be made.1,2,3 
QALYs are also used by organisations such as the National Institute for Health and 
Care Excellence and the Scottish Medicines Consortium to decide whether 
treatments are too expensive to made available on the National Health Service 
(NHS)4,5. For example, NICE often uses the rough rule that new treatments should 
not exceed a cost of £30,000 per QALY.6 
 
  QALYs (and their close relation, disability-adjusted life years) have faced some 
criticism on ethical grounds.  In particular it is charged that they discriminate against 
older patients who will gain fewer QALYs per intervention (because of their age)7; or 
differently abled patients (because the definition of “full health” used presupposes 
e.g. mobility).8 Nonetheless, the use of QALYs provides an important discipline to 
thought.  Even in countries (such as the Netherlands or Norway) which have adopted 
additional formal criteria incorporating equity concerns, calculations of QALY gain 
play an important role in supporting decision making.9-10 There is a substantial 
ethical literature discussing both the ethical (or unethical) nature of QALYs 
themselves, and critiquing different decisions reached using QALY. Where QALYs 
have generally been neglected, however, is in the debate regarding assisted dying. 
As we show in the paper, the QALY has the potential to unlock important new 
additional arguments in favour of the case for assisted dying. In this paper we use 
“assisted dying” to indicate both assisted suicide and euthanasia, though the former 
is perhaps more likely to be legalised, at least in the United Kingdom. 
 
The primary economic argument for assisted dying: avoiding negative QALYs 
 
 Proponents of assisted dying and euthanasia often argue that death is the only way 
for some patients to avoid immense suffering. Some make this argument using the 
phrase “worse than death” or “a life not worth living” which has proven controversial. 
For example, Bobbie Farsides has argued that the latter phrase is not a useful one.11 
There are indeed philosophical difficulties in comparing known suffering with the 
unknowns of death, but Farsides herself concedes that patients who are competent 
and wish to die but are denied the chance to do so because of the illegality of 
assisted dying should be compensated: 
 
 Competent adults may claim that their life is not worth living and that they wish 
their life to end. Such claims must be investigated sympathetically. If the claims persist 
despite optimum care and in the absence of depression healthcare professionals must 
find ways to compensate such patients for the fact that society has denied them the 
means to exercise their autonomy. How patients could or should be compensated has 
not been determined. 
 
In health economics QALYs are used to evaluate health gains. A QALY is a 
consequentialist measure of health which involves multiplying the time in a health 
state by a factor which represents the quality of life experienced in that health state.  
Most health states are preferable to death, and so attract a quality of life score which 
is greater than zero, indicating that life in that health state is preferable to no life at 
all.  (Roudijk et al discuss the reasons why it is appropriate to set death as the zero 
of the quality of life scale).12 However, some limited literature has examined the 
value of health states worse than death. For example, Patrick and colleagues 
conducted a study among well adults and nursing home residents and found that 
“Most respondents evaluated their current health and severe constant pain as better 
than death; dementia and coma were more often considered equal to or worse than 
death”, and so dementia and coma would attract a negative QALY weight. In this 
study, both the states rated as worse than death were hypotheticals not yet 
experienced by patients,13 but the evidence suggests that most of those who seek 
assisted dying do so in order to avoid unattractive outcomes, so at least regard 
death as preferable to continuing life.14 
 
If the goal is to maximise positive QALYs and minimise negative QALYs (time in 
states scored worse than death), assisted dying can be seen as a relatively low-cost 
intervention. For example, if one person continue to live for two years with a Quality 
of Life score of -.5, provision of assisted suicide would result in a net gain of 1 QALY 
at well below the NICE threshold mentioned above.  In the remainder of the text we 
discuss some ways in which the overall QALYs from assisted dying might be 
calculated: the logic of our calculations is summarized in Table 1.  
 
What would the cumulative QALY benefits be in terms of negative QALYs avoided if 
assisted dying were permitted in the UK? The numbers of deaths in the UK in 2017 
was 607,172 (533,253 in England and Wales,15, 57,883 in Scotland,16 and 16,036 in 
Northern Ireland17).  What percentage of these deaths would be assisted if assisted 
dying were legalised?  For a high estimate, we may consider the case of the 
Netherlands, where 4% of deaths are now assisted,18 which would translate to 
24,287 deaths in the UK.  For a low estimate, we may consider Oregon, where 
approximately 0.4% of deaths are assisted (13319 out of a total of 36,640 deaths in 
201720), which would translate to 2,429 deaths in the UK context. (Note that the legal 
situation differs between the Netherlands and Oregon: the Netherlands permits 
euthanasia, which accounts for a large share of the deaths, whereas Oregon allows 








Total annual deaths Ω 607,172 607,172 
% of deaths which could be 
assisted r 0.04 0.004 
Potential assisted deaths a=Ω×r 24,287 2,429 
Calculation of 
QALYs from time 
in state worse 
than death 
averted 
Averted time in bad health 
state per assisted death 
(years) t 0.33333333 0.333333 
Quality of life score of bad 
health state h -0.25 -0.25 
QALYS for averted life in 




Resource saving per 
assisted death m 3,064 3,064 
Total resource savings s=a×m 74,406,905 7,440,690 
Cost per QALY valuation λ 30,000 30,000 
QALYS from investing 
resource savings Q2=s/λ 2,480 248 
Calculations of 
QALYs from organ 
donation 
% of assisted deaths where 
assistance results in organ 
donation p 0.05 0.05 
QALYs gained from each 
death with organ donation d 12 12 
QALYS from additional 
organ donations Q3=a×p×d 14,572 1,457 





The total number of QALYs which would be realized (or negative QALYs which are 
averted) by legalizing assisted dying depends on the “weight” of each death in QALY 
terms.  Suppose that each assisted death saves 4 months of suffering (the Oregon 
law, for example, requires that patients seeking assisted dying must have at most 6 
months to live), and that such a life would have a Quality of Life score of -0.25.  In 
that case, 2,024 negative QALYs would be averted on our high Netherlands uptake 
scenario and 202 negative QALYs in our low Oregon uptake scenario. Once again, 
we stress that avoiding suffering and respecting autonomy remain the primary 
arguments for assisted dying; this and the following economic arguments are 
additional and supplementary. 
 
 
The secondary economic argument for assisted dying: gaining positive QALYs 
 
 The QALY benefits of permitting assisted dying are already substantial even if we 
only consider the patients who are helped to die. But further QALY gains are 
possible because denying access to assisted dying means that patients remain alive 
(against their wishes), and this can often necessitate considerable consumption of 
resources. For example, a patient who is in great pain because of cancer with a life 
expectancy of around two years will continue to require pain medication and support 
from clinical staff and also carers for those two years. For each such patient, 
legalising assisted dying would avoid this waste of resources.  
  
Competent patients who wish to access assisted dying, but need these resources 
because their wish is not granted represents a violation of the autonomy of these 
patients. If they happened to actively require life-support, they could ask for it to be 
turned off, but for most patients this is not an option.21 This particular violation of 
autonomy is two-fold; these patients do not wish to continue living, but because they 
must do so, they require resources that they would prefer were used to save and 
improve other patients’ lives.   
 
What quantity of resources might be saved from legalizing assisted dying?  It is 
possible to get a rough sense of the magnitude.  Many patients who seek assisted 
dying are suffering from cancer (e.g. around 2/3 in the Netherlands) and Round et al 
estimate that 12 months of care for a cancer patient at the end of life costs £9,914, 
including, health, social, charity and informal care.22  If only one third of these costs 
could be saved through assisted dying, at the UK level this would translate to £74m 
in the high scenario and £7.4m in the low scenario.  This money could be used to 
purchase 2,480 or 248 QALYs respectively at the £30,000 per QALY rate, or indeed 
could be spent addressing other moral challenges faced by the health system, such 
as reducing inequalities in health linked to deprivation. This is an additional 
economic argument for legalising assisted dying; in no way is it intended to suggest 
that any such care should be denied to any patient. 
 
The tertiary economic argument for assisted dying: QALY gain through organ 
donation 
 
  In addition to the two preceding economic arguments in favour of assisted dying, 
there is also a tertiary argument. Allowing patients to access assisted dying enables 
many of them to become organ donors. Despite the assumption that donation is not 
possible after assisted suicide or euthanasia, in many countries this is a reality for 
patients. Only cancer is normally a contraindication. Patients who are denied 
assisted dying could also end up donating their organs, but there are several 
reasons why donation after assisted dying is better from a clinical and economic 
perspective. First, if patients are denied assisted dying, organ function will gradually 
deteriorate until they die naturally, meaning that transplantation is less likely to be 
successful. Second, patients who choose assisted dying have to go through a 
lengthy process, and organ donation can be easily integrated into that process (non-
coercively), decreasing the risk that family members will attempt to overrule 
donation, which often occurs when a patient dies in a way that is not planned. 
Finally, because of the planned nature of the death, it is even possible that a tissue 
match could be found before the organs are explanted.23 For all these reasons, 
enabling assisted dying could also enable an additional, highly beneficial source of 
organs for transplantation. The primary argument is that enabling assisted dying 
avoids suffering; the second is that doing so frees up more resources for other 
patients. This third argument is similar to the second, but actually involves patients 
choosing to share their organs – a precious resource- with others after they die. 
 
 As noted above, many of those who seek assisted dying are suffering from cancer 
and for such patients their organs would not be available for transplantation.  
However, it is clear that the QALY benefits of having access to organs for translation 
can be significant (see Table 1 in Nunnink and Cook24 for a summary of the 
 evidence). Evidence from Belgium suggests that 10% of those accessing euthanasia 
could donate at least one organ.25 Even if only 5% of those seeking assisted dying 
are enabled thereby to donate their organs, but this leads to 12 additional QALYs 
being gained from the transplantation (bearing in mind that more than one organ 
may be made available), then the benefits may be substantial: 14,572 QALYs in the 
high scenario and 1,457 QALYs in the low scenario. Once again, this is a 
supplemental argument to the foregoing economic arguments, and organ donation is 
an extra benefit that can flow from euthanasia, not a direct reason for legalising 




  We anticipate two main objections to the three arguments we have presented here. 
The first is that it is callous to consider assisted dying from the perspective of 
resource management; these are real people with real lives. This criticism is 
misplaced. Part of the motivation for our argument is precisely that these are real 
people with real lives who wish to avoid suffering. As we have striven to make clear, 
we are simply arguing that the economic costs of denying assisted dying should not 
be ignored; they should not be the key driver of any legal change, but it would be 
irresponsible not to consider them. Our argument simply shows that permitting 
assisted dying would help such people avoid negative QALYs, while also yielding 
QALY benefits for other patients. Indeed, as denying an assisted death causes 
actual harm to others, it may force a patient into a situation where their core ethical 
beliefs are violated.  Consider the case of a dying consequentialist.  Her healthcare 
costs in her last agonising few months push the overall cost-benefit calculation for 
 her life into the red: alongside the physical and psychological trauma of dying, she 
now must bear the moral horror of having consumed more than she has produced, 
and made a negative net contribution to the world. Hence, we see assisted dying as 
enabling patients to live lives which are more fully consistent with their own ethical 
values (consequentialist or not).  
 
  A counter-counter-objection might be that, even if economic considerations are only 
secondary and not primary, even mentioning them might make people feel pressured 
to seek assisted dying rather than to continue as a patient who (like any other) 
imposes costs on the healthcare system. This is a variant of the ‘burden’ argument 
against assisted dying, which holds that if it is legalised, people who do not really 
want to die but feel they are burdening their relatives will seek assisted suicide or 
euthanasia. It is true that knowledge of the costs averted by legalising assisted dying 
could provide another avenue for burden-type thinking. However, our primary 
argument is about averting suffering for individual patients (albeit at a larger 
population scale), and as such is not vastly dissimilar to typical autonomy and harm-
avoidance arguments in favour of assisted dying. Furthermore, it is not clear why 
information about the actual costs of maintaining the prohibition of assisted dying 
should be withheld from citizens. If society is to make informed decisions about 
assisted dying, all relevant evidence should be considered. 
 
 The second objection is that our argument relies on negative QALYs, and that use 
of this concept in this context is fundamentally flawed. Barrie has made this 
argument at some length, specifically with the aim of defeating resource arguments 
against permitting assisted dying, so we consider his objections in detail here. One 
 of his concerns is that death is not specific enough; he argues that “'Death' might 
include the process of dying, whereas 'being dead' would not.”26 This is simply 
wrong; death is the state after the dying process is complete. 
 
 Barrie’s main argument is that “preferences about euthanasia involve more than 
comparisons between states (e.g. death), and indeed more than comparisons 
between events (e.g. dying), because they also involve actions (e.g. killing), that is, 
changes in states that are brought about in a particular way.” This may be true, but it 
is no argument against the use of QALYs in this particular context. The fact that 
killing (or self-killing) is part of assisted dying does not change the fact that assisted 
dying can remove negative QALYs. Arguing about semantics does not change that. 
 
 Barrie also argues that proponents of assisted dying draw a false equivalence: “The 
intuitively plausible idea that there are some states of living which are so unbearable 
that one might be better off dead is taken to be equivalent to the idea that 
commissioned killing would be preferable to these states”. But no-one argues this. 
Rather, we argue that this idea is justification for allowing assisted dying, subject to 
the sort of control which have been introduced in countries where assisted dying has 
been legalised. 
 
Adopting the patient’s perspective, Barrie also argues that “The QALY cannot make 
sense of a patient who might believe that their suffering would be relieved when they 
are dead, and welcome the prospect of death for that reason, while at the same time 
not wanting to undergo the process of dying and thus preferring to postpone their 
death.” But the QALY doesn’t need to “make sense of” this, though it easily can. 
 Here we simply have a patient who is in state A and would prefer to be in State D but 
doesn’t want to undergo B (painful death) or C (assisted dying). Most patients who 
wish to access assisted dying do not want to delay dying; they want to accelerate it 
(though some may want to know whether it is an option without wanting to access it 
yet; this can provide valuable reassurance even for those who never end up dying 
with assistance). In a similar vein, he argues that “Death is problematical for the 
QALY because death needs to be imaginable as ‘death-for-me’ if we are to have 
preferences about its realization, and this ties one down to a very specific notion of 
death: as an imagined health state, or as some property that one can have and then 
lose.” But death doesn’t need to be an imagined health state.  It may just be an 
absence of suffering or any experience at all, which for many people is preferable to 




 We have suggested and defended three economic arguments that support 
permitting assisted dying for competent patients who wish to end their lives. While 
the modelling assumptions might be contested and the empirical basis of our 
calculations could be stronger if better data was available, our main point is that it is 
possible to get a sense of the order of magnitude of the population-level health 
benefits that could flow from legalizing assisted dying.  The legal arrangements for 
assisted dying vary widely from country to country, and if the UK was to legalise 
assisted dying (presumably in the form of assisted suicide) the calculations here 
could be made more precise based on the specifics of the approach under 
consideration.  Nevertheless, our paper shows in general that denying dying 
 plausibly imposes great costs on both patients who wish to die and those who do 
not.  A slightly counterintuitive finding of our analysis is that (given the admittedly 
rough and ready numbers we use) the benefits to the individual patients who chose 
assisted dying may in fact be outweighed by the broader benefits to society through 
reduced resource use and the improved potential for organ donation. However, our 
argument is not that legalisation of assisted dying should be primarily based on 
economic arguments; these are supplemental facts that should not be neglected. 
Legalising assisted dying in the UK is likely to yield a substantial increase in QALYs 
across the patient population as a whole.  
References 
 
1. Williams A. The value of QALYS. In Stephen Holland (ed.), Arguing About 
Bioethics. Routledge 2012:423 
2. Drummond MF, Sculpher MJ, Claxton K, et al. Methods for the Economic 
Evaluation of Health Care Programmes. Oxford: OUP 2015. 
3. Neumann PJ, Sanders GD, Russell LB, et al. Cost-Effectiveness in Health and 
Medicine. 2nd edition. Oxford: OUP 2017. 
4. Ogden J. QALYs and their role in the NICE decision-making process. Prescriber 
2017;28:41-43. 
5. Scottish Medicines Consortium. How we make our decisions. 
https://www.scottishmedicines.org.uk/how-we-decide/  (Accessed 11/3/19) 
6. National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE). Carrying NICE over the 
threshold. https://www.nice.org.uk/news/blog/carrying-nice-over-the-threshold  
(Accessed 11/3/19) 
7. Harris J. QALYfying the value of life. Journal of Medical Ethics 1987,13,117-123  
8. John TM, Millum J, Wasserman D. How to Allocate Scarce Health Resources 
without Discriminating against People with Disabilities. Econ Philos 2017;33(2):161-
86. 
9. Ottersen T, Forde R, Kakad M, et al. A new proposal for priority setting in Norway: 
Open and fair. Health Policy 2016;120(3):246-51. 
10. Reckers-Droog VT, van Exel NJA, Brouwer WBF. Looking back and moving 
forward: On the application of proportional shortfall in healthcare priority setting in 
the Netherlands. Health Policy 2018;122(6):621-29. 
11. Farsides B, Dunlop RJ. Is there such a thing as a life not worth living? BMJ 2001 
Jun 16; 322(7300): 1481–1483. 
12. Roudijk B, Donders ART, Stalmeier PFM. Setting Dead at Zero: Applying Scale 
Properties to the QALY Model. Med Decis Making 2018;38(6):627-34. 
13. Patrick et al. Measuring Preferences for Health States Worse than Death. Med 
Decis Making 1994;14:9-18. 
 
                                                 
                                                                                                                                                        
14. Pearlman RA, Hsu C, Starks H, et al. Motivations for physician-assisted suicide. 
J Gen Intern Med 2005;20(3):234-9. 
15. Office for National Statistics. Deaths registered in England and Wales: 2017. 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmarriages/d
eaths (Accessed 11/3/19) 
16. National Records of Scotland. Vital Events Reference Tables 2017 
Section 5: Deaths https://www.nrscotland.gov.uk/statistics-and-
data/statistics/statistics-by-theme/vital-events/general-publications/vital-events-
reference-tables/2017/section-5-deaths (Accessed 11/3/19) 
17. Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency. Death statistics 2017.  
https://www.nisra.gov.uk/publications/death-statistics (Accessed 11/3/19) 
18.  European Institute of Bioethics. Report 2016 euthanasia in Netherlands 
https://www.ieb-eib.org/en/document/report-2016-euthanasia-in-netherlands-
488.html (Accessed 11/3/19) 
19. Oregon Health Authority. Oregon Death with Dignity Act: Data summary 2016. 
https://www.oregon.gov/oha/ph/providerpartnerresources/evaluationresearch/deathw
ithdignityact/documents/year19.pdf (Accessed 11/3/19) 
20. Oregon Health Authority. Annual Report Volume 2: Deaths and Perinatal Deaths 
Data 
https://www.oregon.gov/oha/PH/BIRTHDEATHCERTIFICATES/VITALSTATISTICS/
ANNUALREPORTS/VOLUME2/Pages/index.aspx (Accessed 11/3/19) 
21. Shaw D. The body as unwarranted life-support. J Med Ethics 2007;33(9):519-21. 
22. Round J, Jones L, Morris S. Palliat Med. Estimating the cost of caring for people 
with cancer at the end of life: A modelling study. Palliat Med 2015 Dec;29(10):899-
907. 
23. Shaw D. Organ Donation After Assisted Suicide: A Potential Solution to the 
Organ Scarcity Problem. Transplantation 2014 98: 247-251. 
24. Nunnink L, Cook DA. Palliative ICU beds for potential organ donors: an effective 
use of resources based on quality-adjusted life-years gained. Crit Care Resusc. 
2016 Mar;18(1):37-42. 
25. Bollen J, van Smaalen T, ten Hoopen R, et al. Potential Number of Organ 
Donors After Euthanasia in Belgium. JAMA. 2017;317(14):1476–1477. 
doi:10.1001/jama.2017.0729  
26. Barrie S. QALYs, euthanasia and the puzzle of death. J Med Ethics 
201;41(8):635-8. 
